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ARTICLE

Leveraging Learning to Improve Disaster Management
Outcomes
Denise D. P. Thompson*
Department of Public Management, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, NY 10019, U.S.A.

Abstract Disaster management agencies should be exemplars of learning given the volatility of their operating environment. However, there are cognitive, social, and organizational
barriers that prevent these organizations from learning. The
purpose of this article is to use the Caribbean Disaster and
Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) as an example of
an organization that achieves double-loop learning in spite
of known barriers. This research shows significant learning
variations in the CDEMA organization from the regional to the
national level. The results demonstrate that the CDEMA Coordinating Unit and a few national member agencies achieve
double-loop learning, while the opposite is true for many
national disaster offices. Analysis of this variation is one contribution to the disaster management and organizational learning literature. The article also suggests that organizational
culture is an important precursor to learning and adds a much
needed case example to the management and learning literature. The study ends with a proposal for future research in
the area of disaster management, culture and learning, and
propositions for national disaster offices to consider in order to
enhance double-loop learning.
Keywords Caribbean, CDEMA, disaster management,
double-loop learning, learning barriers

1

Introduction

Disaster management agencies should be particularly concerned about creating an organizational culture committed to
learning. These organizations need to survive and thrive in a
changing environment (Torlak 2004). According to Garvin,
Edmondson, and Gino (2008), learning organizations are
adept at two groups of skills. First, they are good at creating,
acquiring, interpreting, transferring, and retaining knowledge.
Second, they are able to modify their behavior to respond to
the new knowledge and insights they gain. Disaster management agencies operate in volatile environments that require
great agility and adaptability. They must orient themselves to
routine disaster events as well as to the increasing incidence
of low probability catastrophic events that accompany the
warming of the globe among other drivers. Sanne (2012)
stresses the crucial need for these skills in the survival of
* E-mail: dthompson@jjay.cuny.edu

safety critical industries like disaster management agencies
that must work to save lives and property.
Prominent organizational theorists including Chris Argyris
and Donald Schön (1978), Edgar Schein (1985), Alfred
Chandler (1990), Chris Argyris (1996), and Peter Senge
(1990, 2003) endorse the idea of creating a culture dedicated
to learning in organizational systems. They suggest that a
culture committed to self-diagnosis and learning is needed in
an environment characterized by rapid change and deepening
complexity such as disaster management organizations. If
disaster management organizations commit to a culture of
learning, then leaders facilitate continuous expansion of their
employees’ capacity to create the desired results, and they
nurture new ways of thinking. Employees—individually and
collectively—are continually learning how to learn (Senge
1990). By facilitating learning, leaders in these organizations
are then able to meet the challenges of a turbulent world
(Morgan 1997).
The empirical evidence on disaster management supports
the view that these agencies must learn if they want to adapt
and be successful. These organizations must not only intentionally practice information collection, but they must also
reflect on the information collected or generated, and reorient
their thinking and practices if they are to be effective (Smith
and Elliot 2007). The policy and disaster management literature documents the special importance of learning to disaster
management organizations (Carroll 1998; Smith and Elliot
2007; Birkland 1997; Sanne 2012). Yet, as McPherson, Elliot,
and Antonacopoulou (2010) point out, there is persistent
barriers to capturing lessons from failure.
Many of the barriers concern cognitive biases embedded
in the values and belief systems of disaster managers that
cause them to miss some of the lessons from disaster events
(Torlak 2004). Constant reorientation from varying events
they face means that they often miss appropriate lessons and
repeat errors resulting in future vulnerabilities (Sanne 2012).
In addition, self-interest and political oversight make drawing
lessons from events difficult. Disaster managers “need to
learn through thorough scrutiny of the few serious events that
do happen to them, from near-miss events, learn from others’
experience and learn from non-events through simulation,
interdisciplinary investigation teams, learning seminars,
risk analysis and the like” (Sanne 2012, 3). The processes,
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environment, and leadership of managers must be conducive
to learning (Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino 2008).
In his 1985 book on Organizational Culture and Leadership Schein posed an important question about organizations:
Is it possible to create a culture committed to continuous selfdiagnosis, learning, and change? (Schein 1985, 361). Using
this question as a point of departure, the purpose of this article
is to show how CDEMA has used various means to achieve
double-loop learning despite well-known barriers to learning
in high-hazard organizational environments. CDEMA faces
not only routine hazard impacts, but also low-probability,
high-impact catastrophic events. This article examines
CDEMA’s experiences to show how and what information the
agency collects or creates and how it applies lessons learned.
This research both contributes to the academic literature
on disaster management and organization theory and adds a
much needed case example on organizational learning in
disaster management. Smith and Elliot (2007) citing Pauchant
and Douville’s (1993) extensive review of the disaster and
crisis management literature, note the neglect of cultural and
psychological dimensions of crisis management including
organizational learning. Smith and Elliot (2007, 5) emphasize
that in crisis management we must move the notion of learning “beyond narrowly defined technical solutions toward
fundamental shifts in the areas of culture, cognitive representations and communications—the human-centered, supposedly ‘softer’ aspects of organizations.” This article focuses
on culture and how it helps or hinders learning. It also shows
that while there are known barriers to learning in disaster
management organizations, double-loop learning is possible.
In addition, the article offers practical insights on how
disaster managers and planners can leverage organizational
learning to improve performance and thereby reduce loss of
life and property as well as economic, social, and cultural
dislocation.

with consultants/academics working with CDEMA; and one
with a former senior employee of the CDEMA Coordinating
Unit. Interviews focused on organizational structure, organizational capacity, learning, and politics, and their effects on
the effectiveness of disaster management agencies. The primary research question guiding this research is: Is it possible
to create a culture committed to continuous self-diagnosis,
learning, and change in disaster management agencies?
This question is broken down into four sub-questions: Does
CDEMA learn? What are the sources of learning? What does
it learn? How are lessons applied? The interviews revealed
thick descriptions of the scope of learning, what CDEMA
learns and how it applies knowledge. Interviews were followed by observations and discussions with disaster managers at the 6th Annual Caribbean Conference held in Trinidad
and Tobago 5–9 December 2011 where the author was the
chair of a panel on the Competencies and Skills for Effective
Implementation of Comprehensive Disaster Management
(CDEMA 2011).
The article is organized as follows: It begins with a review
of the literature on learning, organizations, and organizational
culture that focuses on high hazard organizations. Then it
provides a brief background of the Caribbean region where
CDEMA resides, and offers an outline of the CDEMA system. Next it presents CDEMA’s learning model and describes
and examines whether and what CDEMA learns, demonstrates how it applies knowledge, and assesses how this
application constitutes double-loop learning. Next the article
examines the barriers to double-loop learning. It concludes by
revisiting the question proposed at the start of the article: Is
it possible to create a culture committed to continuous selfdiagnosis, learning, and change—double-loop learning?

2

Learning is the intentional practice of collecting information,
reflecting on it, and sharing the findings produced by this
introspective process within the organization so as to improve
the organization’s performance (Milway and Saxton 2011).
Learning occurs when entities acquire new knowledge
or their experiences modify existing knowledge, challenging
the default logic (Serrat 2009). According to Weick (1991),
if there is a shift in performance when the stimulus has
essentially remained the same, then learning has taken place.
Organizations engage in either single- or double-loop
learning (Senge 1990). Senge has noted that single-loop
learning is a precursor to double-loop learning. Single-loop
learning focuses on current, short term problem solving at the
expense of critical assessment of the conditions that led to the
current results in the first place (Senge 1990). Single-loop
learning works in organizations that undertake routine-type
work. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, focuses on
redefining problems and questioning common sense thinking
about them (Senge 1990).

Methods

This case study is a follow-up study to the one I concluded
(Thompson 2010) on disaster management in multi-state
disaster management systems and the critical role that learning plays in the CDEMA system. The research’s main
assumption is that to be effective, disaster management entities must act like active learning systems organized around
the logic of anticipating and preempting all possible disasters
including low probability, catastrophic events as well as
routine emergencies. It uses this state of active learning,
anticipation, reflection, and preemption as a proxy for a
“culture of learning” as proposed by Schein.
The original research utilized secondary sources as well as
the responses to 24 in-depth face-to-face interviews: nine
with national disaster coordinators; four with senior employees of national disaster offices; six with senior employees
at the CDEMA Coordinating Unit; two from senior staff at
international agencies funding programs at CDEMA; two

3 Characteristics of the Learning
Organization and Disaster Management

Thompson. Leveraging Learning to Improve Disaster Management Outcomes
Table 1.
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Summary of common features of single-loop and double-loop learning

Dimensions

Characteristics of Single-Loop Learning

Characteristics of Double-Loop Learning

Focus
Perspective

Problem solving for goal attainment; Capturing lessons
Future strategies depend on prior experiences

Impact
Outlook
Strategy
Culture

Incremental improvements
Short term
Passive engagement
Putting out fires, reducing vulnerabilities; Addressing
operational issues

Strategic questioning of assumptions; Cultivating knowledge; Capturing lessons
Future strategies involve creating and solving problems; Questioning
assumptions; Integration of new and old ideas
Improvements are transformative
Long term
Active engagements; Scenario mapping
System-wide thinking, self-questioning; Rethinking assumptions

Source: This table was refined from one developed in Thompson 2010, 243. The original table was developed using the works of organizational theorists
including Argyris and Schön (1978), Wimberg and Hollins (2002), Wittrock (1992), and Senge (1990), and my understanding of organizational learning.

Table 1 presents a summary of the common features of
single- and double-loop learning. The move from single- to
double-loop learning constitutes a fundamental shift in an
organization’s culture, strategic focus, and employee engagement. Disaster management agencies that boast a culture of
learning reside on the double-loop learning side of Table 1.
These organizations’ leaders facilitate an organizational climate that is suited to learning. They encourage and facilitate
both access to, and cultivation of, knowledge as well as the
transfer and interpretation of knowledge.
No one disaster management agency will acquire all the
skills, competencies, and experiences necessary for comprehensive disaster management simply because they will not
undergo the range of experiences necessary to build these
skills and competences. Because they are expected to handle
all types of hazards and all phases of the disaster management
cycle, we expect disaster management agencies to reside on
the double-loop side of Table 1. Consequently, they have to
cultivate knowledge as much as they have to capture it.
Reflection is one method of knowledge creation. Greenwood, borrowing from Schön (1983, 1987), suggests that
reflective practices facilitate the integration of theory and
practice, the correction of errors, and the questioning of
values and norms that underpin the organization’s operating
context. Reflection leads to an understanding of the barriers
that limit effectiveness and generates a more comprehensive
knowledge base, thereby improving outcomes in future
events. Reflection requires a “cognitive post mortem where a
practitioner reviews her actions to explore again the understandings she brought to them in light of her outcomes”
(Greenwood 1998, 1049). Double-loop learning involves
reflections-on-action.
Sadly, many disaster management organizations do not
have the time to reflect because of the hectic pace of their
operating environment. There are also sometimes large
intervals between disasters, which can lead to complacency.
In addition, change in leadership and other key staff and
impact the organization’s culture for learning.
Double-loop learning does not come easy. There must be a
strategic emphasis on learning by leaders to overcome the
barriers to this form of learning. Many disaster management
leaders, knowing that organizations need to learn, grapple

with how to make their organizations learning organizations
(Torlak 2004; Milway and Saxton 2011). Others do not learn
from past experiences and near misses because there are
barriers to doing so.

4 Cognitive, Social, and Organizational
Barriers to Double-Loop Learning in
Disaster Management
Jaques (2009) observes that there is extensive scholarship on
the proven barriers to effective post-crisis learning. Smith and
Elliot (2007) cite a number of cognitive and social barriers to
the emergence of double-loop learning crisis organizations.
Cognitive barriers include the rigidity of core beliefs, values,
and assumptions; the failure to recognize similar or identical
situations that happen elsewhere; and the focus on singleloop, or single-cause, learning.
Disaster managers’ beliefs, values, expectations, and preferences heavily determine their perception and interpretation
of a situation (Smith and Elliot 2007; Sanne 2012; Carroll
1998). Rigidity of core beliefs, values, and assumptions
means that managers tend to absorb those pieces of information that fit in with their own beliefs and disregard the
information that does not (Torlak 2004; Sanne 2012). This
situation often leads to managers intentionally misinterpreting the real threats and stick to the actions that uphold their
belief system (Torlak 2004; Sanne 2012).
Disaster managers sometimes fail to recognize similar or
identical situations that happen elsewhere because of the
frequency with which these situations occur. For instance,
event frequency may cause managers to wrongly assume that
the deficiencies seen are representative, when they are not
(Torlak 2004). They might assume that because they handle
routine disaster fairly well, they would be just as successful in
dealing with high impact, low probability events.
A focus upon single-loop, or single-cause, learning may
bind managers to a losing course of action as they try to refine
existing decisions when they should be questioning their
basic assumptions (Torlak 2004). For instance, managers who
are always putting out “fires,” dealing with one problem after
another read everything as a fire to be put out.
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Social barriers are often wrapped up in political and
psychological factors (Smith and Elliot 2007; Torlak 2004).
Psychologically, the manager, self-interested in keeping his
job and saving face, often distorts the event in the aftermath
of the crisis event. As a consequence, the manager ignores the
broader implications of the crisis and exposes the organization to future vulnerabilities. In addition, managers often
misinterpret the real threats that exist because of constant
pressure by political actors to perform. This causes the disaster manager to behave irrationally so as to save his and the
organization’s reputation. For example, because of political
pressure, disaster managers might be quick to act, ignoring
lessons that could be critical in successfully resolving crises.
There are also organizational barriers to learning. Simon
and others suggest that structure and learning are related in a
circular manner. Structure is an outcome of learning, but also
determines learning processes (Simon 1969; Fiol and Lyles
1985). A centralized mechanistic structure tends to reinforce
past behaviors, while an organic, more decentralized structure
tends to allow shifts of beliefs and actions and facilitates
greater learning because there is a reduction of the cognitive
overload on the individual (Fiol and Lyles 1985). To overcome some of the cognitive, social, and organizational barriers Torlak (2004, 96) recommends that disaster management
organizations “should have flexible structures and cultures
that motivate managers to find better ways of behaving,
or new methods, contexts, and alternatives.” The barriers
noted above are rooted in the cultural context of the disaster
management organization.

5 Organizational Culture and Its
Importance to Learning
Culture is the climate, learned behavior, and practices that
organizations develop over time. It guides the way people
work, the way they communicate, and the values they share
and is an important explanatory variable in clarifying why
organizations succeed or fail (Schein 2004). Culture points to
phenomena that are below the surface, that, although invisible, are powerful influences on the organization in important
ways. It creates shared values in organizational members and
also guides their actions much like an individual’s personality
does (Schein 2004; Chandler 1990). In the area of crisis and
emergency management, McPherson, Elliot, and Antonacopoulou (2010) lament that organizational culture is so little
taken into consideration when we assess learning, yet culture
is important because it constitutes the organizational context.
Learning, they note, is purposeful and contextually specific.
The context within which learning takes place shapes the
learning process because it provides symbolic undertones
for learning. Hence, when we ignore culture in disaster
management and how it impacts learning, we miss some of
the explanatory richness that culture facilitates.
Culture affects organizations at several levels of operation.
At the level of overall business environment, cultural values
guide business operations, provide its legal context, and,

importantly, provide the broad meanings by which we interpret business events (Chandler 1990). For instance, disaster
management organizations that are focused on technical
issues tend to understand crises in technical terms and
propose technical solutions. Their culture limits these organizations’ assessment of phenomena, which results in them
missing cues that are not technically linked. At the suborganizational level, we belong to socially defined groups
that have common experiences that further filter our interpretation of events—subcultures. The prevalence of multiple
groups and, consequently, multiple identities provide diversity to values and understanding. This enriches learning
(Chandler 1990). Unfortunately, technical values often co-opt
other dominant values in disaster management. At the level
of the organization, it is the overall business culture that
dominates and dictates the values of the organization and its
operational context. A business culture that places value on
learning promotes a culture dedicated to it and vice versa.
Schein (2004) cites research that shows that we can improve
organizational performance by creating a certain kind of culture that nurtures inquiry, values performance, and identifies
with the entire organization.
This review has several implications. The literature offers
a guide to the link between organizational culture and learning. It also identifies necessary attributes of learning and cues
us into the variations between single-loop learning and
double-loop learning. It shows the importance of double-loop
learning to disaster management, but also questions whether
this type of learning is possible in disaster management organizations. The disaster and crisis management literature tends
to focus on technical, cognitive, and social barriers to learning, ignoring the organizational factors such as structural and
cultural barriers. This article shows how organizational
factors, including organizational culture, inhibit double-loop
learning at the country level. In addition, the literature on
learning indicates that the learning organization displays a
culture of learning throughout the organization. A disaster
management organization might also exhibit different cultures throughout its multiple levels. Moreover, the article
pulls together the theoretical knowledge on learning as well
as empirical investigation into CDEMA to add to the disaster
management and organizational learning literature. The
attributes of double-loop learning form an analytical frame
for assessing whether CDEMA learns, and whether what it
learns constitutes double-loop learning (learning culture).
The following sections draw on the experiences of the
Caribbean regional disaster management system CDEMA.
These sections present CDEMA’s background, and its
implicit learning model. They also examine how CDEMA
uses knowledge, and whether this application implies singleor double-loop learning.

6

Caribbean Regional Background

In the Caribbean, the impact of natural hazards has had
serious negative consequences on economic development

Thompson. Leveraging Learning to Improve Disaster Management Outcomes

(Thompson 2010). Disasters related to hurricanes have been
the most frequent hazard, but earthquakes and volcanoes have
caused the most loss of life. Since the late 1970s several hurricanes have devastated the region and overwhelmed each
territory’s efforts to respond (Poncelet 1997). Most notable
storms are Gilbert (1988), Hugo (1989), Ivan (2004), Katrina
(2005), and Dean (2007). Multiple flooding and landslides
caused by heavy rains occurred in between (Thompson 2010;
Reliefweb n.d.).
In the last decade, there have been two high-impact, lowprobability events in the region: Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and
the Haitian earthquake and subsequent cholera outbreak
in 2010. These events and the responses to them highlight
multiple weaknesses and flawed assumptions in CDEMA.
Hurricane Ivan highlighted the multiple, devastating impacts
that one storm system could have on several countries. The
countries of Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts, and Nevis were the
most severely impacted. In fact, Grenada was so economically devastated after Hurricane Ivan that that country’s
government was unable to repay its national debts and had to
enter into cooperative arrangements with creditors including
the International Monetary Fund on debt repayment terms for
the rest of 2004 and 2005 (United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean 2007). The same
hurricane almost completely obliterated Jamaica’s agricultural sector, costing the country about 8 percent of its GDP
(United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America
and the Caribbean, United Nations Development Program,
and Planning Institute of Jamaica 2004). Hurricane Ivan
slowed economic developmental activities and resulted in
long-term persistent economic difficulties (Thompson 2010;
Jones, Bisek, and Ornstein 2001; United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United
Nations Development Program, and Planning Institute of
Jamaica 2004). Overall, James (2005) estimates over USD
5.7 billion in recovery costs from Hurricane Ivan. The Haitian
earthquake and cholera outbreak in 2010 killed tens of thousands of people, injured another 300,000, and left nearly one
million homeless (Associated Press 2011). The earthquake
overwhelmed Haiti’s health care and economic infrastructure.
It required concerted efforts on the part of bilateral and multilateral agencies as well as from CDEMA to get the disaster
in check. The efforts to rebuild Haiti are ongoing.

7 The Caribbean Disaster and
Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)
An agreement of the Conference of Heads of Government of
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries established
the regional disaster management mechanism Caribbean
Disaster and Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) in
September 1991. Its mission was to plan for and respond to
disasters in the Caribbean (CARICOM Secretariat n.d.). By
September 2009, there was a name change to the Caribbean
Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) to
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better comport with the shift in focus from disaster response
to comprehensive disaster management using the all hazards,
all phases approach (PreventionWeb 2009). CDEMA’s focus
is to plan for and mitigate disaster risks in the Caribbean
including a central focus on the interface between climate
change and disaster management (CDEMA n.d., a).
CDEMA’s founding philosophy is that the countries of the
region succeed or fail together. As such, the organization
adopted common standards for sharing responsibility and
common commitments to disaster management (Collymore
2008).
The CDEMA organization is complex and comprises
several levels of operation and decision making and multiple
vertical and horizontal linkages (Figure 1). It is one of the
specialized agencies of CARICOM coming under the portfolio of the Council for Trade and Economic Development
(COTED), which is one of CARICOM’s seven protocols
detailing how it functions. The Council sits atop the CDEMA
organization, comprises the heads of government of the participating member states or their nominees, and determines
the policies and programs of CDEMA. The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is the technical and programmatic
advisory mechanism of CDEMA. It comprises the National
Disaster Coordinators and representatives of specialized
regional bodies, such as those engaged in technological,
meteorological, and seismological fields whose programs are
directly related to the regional disaster management agenda
(CDEMA n.d., b). The eighteen CDEMA participating member states—Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, Montserrat, Anguilla,
Turks and Caicos, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands,
Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Grenada, Belize, St. Kitts
and Nevis, Guyana, Suriname, and Haiti, sit on the TAC
(CDEMA n.d., c).
The regional Coordinating Unit (CU) is an intergovernmental agency that coordinates all the disaster
management activities. The CU concentrates on five programming areas: (1) education, research, and information; (2)
finance and administration; (3) preparedness and response;
(4) mitigation and research; and (5) information and communication technology (CDEMA n.d., d). An Executive Director
who is appointed by the CDEMA Council manages the
Coordinating Unit.
At the country level are the national disaster offices
(NDOs) each with its own partners, systems of operation,
governance frameworks, and protocols. There is no standardization of organization name, structure, or title of officers in
charge; these vary from country to country (Thompson 2010).
National disaster offices are part of the national governments
of each country and are under the constant watch of the
national governments and other actors in the national political
environment. The national disaster offices remain strongly
centralized but have relationships with many organizations
within and outside of government. They are located at a low
level of their government structure: in only a handful of countries they are at the cabinet level, and they are usually situated
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CARICOM/COTED

Head of
Government

CDEMA Council

Responsible
Government
Minister
Technical Advisory Committee
(TAC)

All National
Disaster
Organizations

CDEMA Coordinating Unit
(CU)

Regional
Response
System
Figure 1.

Model
Documents

Projects and
Programs

CDEMA organization structure

Source: Revised from Thompson 2010, 33.

in line ministries. This low status was noted as a point of
concern in the Enhanced CDM Strategy and Program Framework 2007–2012 (CDERA 2006). It denies NDOs many
of the resources they need, including staffing, funding, and
technology and makes decision making difficult. These
situations have led to high turnover among national disaster
coordinators.
To more fully understand how CDEMA functions, one
must not only understand the vertical linkages presented in
Figure 1, but also understand the horizontal relationships
that exist within CDEMA and between CDEMA and outside
partners. The horizontal linkages include CDEMA CU relationships with other regional bodies as well as the NDOs
working collaboratively with each other to share knowledge
and technical expertise. In addition there are many bilateral
arrangements by both NDOs and the CDEMA CU collectively
and individually. Although these arrangements cannot be seen
on the organization chart, they are important to the overall
CDEMA operation. The vertical and horizontal linkages displayed by CDEMA comport with the general consensus from
the disaster management and organization theory literature
that the network organizational form is the most appropriate
organizational form for handling disasters (Takeda and Helms
2006; Waugh and Streib 2006; Roberts 2006). Because the
region is resource poor, no single agency has the capacity
including technical expertise, technology, and financial
resources it needs to effectively manage large-scale disasters
when they occur. So, they enter into formal and informal
arrangements with those that do.

At the same time, it is not uncommon for bureaucracy and
network to coexist within the same organization, even in public organizations (Mintzberg 1979; Perrow 1993; Considine
and Lewis 1999; O’Toole and Meier 2004; Josserand, Teo,
and Clegg 2006). A hybrid on network and bureaucracy in
disaster management facilitates access to capabilities needed
during different phases of the comprehensive disaster
management cycle, while at the same time promoting good
organizational memory for knowledge retention, internal
efficiencies, control needed for the routine operations in
disaster management, and the ability to coordinate the disparate functional groups that must work together for disaster
management to be effective when there are major hazard
events.
Because it understands the organizational, national, macro-environmental, and geographic issues—including the need
to address climate change as a region of small island states—
the regional coordinating unit of CDEMA realizes that learning is a crucial component in managing disaster planning and
response. CDEMA utilizes an implicit learning model that
entails capturing lessons from wherever they occur, cultivating knowledge, analyzing those pieces of information, and
using them to guide regional and national level policy and
practice (Thompson 2010). This model is presented in
Figure 2 below.
CDEMA’s Implicit Learning Model
In my research on CDEMA (Thompson 2010), I depicted
the CDEMA learning process (see Figure 2) as a step-wise
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1. Experience
• Country experience
• Simulaons
• Technical assistance
• Out-of-region
experience
• Self-reﬂecon

2a. Knowledge
Capture
• Analyze
• Validate
• Document

3. Apply
• Policies
• Procedures
• Pracce
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4. Retain
• Codify/Structure
• Archive
• Secure
• Promulgate

2b. Knowledge
Cultivation
• Queson
assumpons
• Propose problems
• Document

Figure 2.

Model for capturing, cultivating, applying, and retaining information

Source: Modified from Thompson 2010, 257.

iterative process of capturing information from various
sources, applying this information to organizational processes,
and then refining and retaining knowledge acquired for future
use. Figure 2 depicts the learning logic of CDEMA. It shows
four stages for capturing, creating, and retaining knowledge.
Together these stages show how CDEMA achieves doubleloop learning. This process of learning evolved through the
CDEMA CU leadership’s exploration of ways to increase
effectiveness given their resource-poor nature of their institutions and the potential impact of climate change. This section
draws heavily upon Thompson’s work.
At stage one, CDEMA’s regional Coordinating Unit captures information from its observation of various experiences
and from national disaster coordinators via regular reports,
telephone conversations, situation reports, after-actionreports, and audits. The regional CU also collects information
from incidents that take place in countries outside of the
region through news reports, best practice reports, contacts
with international agencies, and agreements (Thompson
2010).
Stage two comprises two sub-stages: (1) CDEMA analyzes,
validates, and documents the collected information, and (2) it
cultivates knowledge through events such as self-reflection
and simulation exercises. The CU and the CDEMA Board
scrutinize the information collected or generated to make
sense of events and scenarios and plan for the next steps to
be taken. During this stage, CDEMA assesses the relevance
and applicability of the information by comparing them with
other relevant and available information (Thompson 2010).
At stage three, the application of learning by organizational leaders results in some behavior modification as seen in the
policies, strategies, procedures, practices, and model documents. Although CDEMA CU is the driver for learning and
knowledge application, it is up to the national disaster offices
to implement lessons in order to drive change nationally.

At stage four, information is codified into appropriate
categories. Organizational leaders are the agents of information collation, analysis, and change. At this stage, archived
information is secured to prevent loss. This information is
then promulgated in various reports and models so that those
involved with CDEMA or wanting information on CDEMA
can access and use that information. This stage is not yet
fully developed.

8 How CDEMA Uses the Learning Model
to Achieve Double-Loop Learning
Caribbean disaster managers describe five broad sources of
knowledge capture: Country experiences, simulation exercises, best practices, out-of-region disaster experiences, and
self-reflection (Thompson 2010). Together they constitute
CDEMA’s double-loop learning logic. Table 2 provides a
summary of these knowledge sources along with the lessons
learned from each source and their application.
Country Experiences
Learning from country experiences can best be summed up in
the lessons learned from Hurricane Ivan described earlier and
from CDEMA’s response to Hurricane Dean three years later
that resulted in significantly less loss of lives and property
damage and internal displacement. Heeding the lessons of
Hurricane Ivan, all projected storms are now taken seriously.
As an example, in preparation for Hurricane Dean, CDEMA
did a number of things differently. The CDEMA CU activated
the Regional Response Mechanism (RRM), which was placed
on standby seventy-two hours before the projected landfall of
Hurricane Dean (Arthurs 2008). The National Disaster Committees in the threatened states reviewed their preparedness
and response plans and initiated readiness actions. CDERA
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Table 2.

Summary of learning modes and their application throughout CDEMA

Modes of Learning

Summary of Lessons Learned by CDEMA

Application of Lessons Learned

Country experience

Technical and technological capabilities and human
resources are areas of weakness for CDEMA. Low
positioning of national level disaster offices hinders
access to critical resources (Grenada and Dominica are
examples); NDOs’ performances at the national level
hindered overall CDEMA performance
Simulation exercises are important to improve systems
and processes in disaster management; they are
especially useful for planning and system appraisal in
resource scarce areas
Introduction of international standards like Hyogo
Framework for Actioni into regional practice allows
access to resources for CDEMA through project funding,
as well as important lessons from other countries and
methodologies for disaster risk reduction
Mitigation is an important component of comprehensive
disaster management (CDM) that needs to be emphasized in the region
How to deliver objectives and leverage limited resources
better; Lessons on how CDEMA can become more
effective

– Enhance technical and technological capability in areas of response
(seen in excellent Hurricane Dean response);
– Improve contingency planning for multi-island hazard impacts;
development of regional response mechanisms

Simulation exercises

Best practices

Out-of-region
experiences
CDEMA
self-reflection

– Improvement in communications and coordination based on tabletop
and field exercises (as in Hurricane Dean);
– Building community response capability and involving leaders of
economic sectors in disaster planning
– Lessons led to Coordination and Harmonization Council—leads to
better optimization of funding, etc;
– Introduction of results-based approach (better measurement of
progress and also identify/quantify areas of need—more targeted
interventions result
– Improvements in contingency planning capability;
– Mitigation of hazard impact on coastal community thereby boosting
community resilience;
– Better organizing and strategizing for delivery of CDM—e.g.
Thematic Coordinating Groups;
– Using projects to drive the delivery of CDM and leverage scarce
resources;
– Strategically filling capability gaps in the CDEMA system by linking
with international disaster reduction arrangements (Hyogo
Framework for Action)

Source: This table was refined from one developed in Thompson 2010, 227.

contacted National Disaster Coordinators and government
officials to ascertain preparedness levels. None of these
activities took place prior to Hurricane Ivan. In addition, both
the Eastern and the North Western Caribbean Donor Groups
convened meetings, and CDEMA developed an operational
plan for worst case scenario in Jamaica and Belize (Gentles
2008). The Pan American Health Organization pre-deployed
in Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Dominica to more readily assess
the public health needs in the impacted states. The United
States Agency for International Development’s Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) deployed a
team to Jamaica, and simultaneously stationed a consultant in
Dominica to coordinate response activities in the smaller
Eastern Caribbean States (Gentles 2008).
The response to Hurricane Dean highlighted the value
of the Eastern Caribbean Donor Group now renamed the
Eastern Caribbean Development Partners Group for Disaster
Management (ECDPGDM). The ECDPGDM was formed
after Hurricane Ivan to support regional mechanisms and
member states in the smaller eastern islands to facilitate an
effective, timely, and coordinated response operation to a
rapid onset emergency (United Nations Development
Program n.d.). The group was able to provide substantial
assistance to Dominica during Hurricane Dean. Given the
success of the ECDPGDM during Hurricane Dean, donors
collaborated to develop a Northwestern Caribbean Donor
Group in order to coordinate donor activities post impact in
the Northwestern Caribbean region (Jackson 2008; Mullings
2008).

Simulation Exercises
CDEMA has learned that when there are scarce financial
resources, simulation exercises can help to identify gaps in
key areas of operation and also provide insights into what is
needed to fill these gaps in order to better respond to future
events. Exercise FAHUM is a case in point. This annual field
exercise is coordinated by United States Military Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) to help the region improve
response coordination, communication, logistics, contingency
planning, and improve efficiencies among member countries
in the CDEMA organization. By posing different scenarios
and attempting to solve problems, simulation exercises allow
CDEMA to facilitate its mandate of comprehensive disaster
management. Simulation exercises (both tabletop and field)
allow CDEMA to be preemptive in planning for disasters.
Simulation scenarios help CDEMA to make systemic
improvements throughout the system through highlighting
successes, failures, and unintended consequence. Simulation
exercises offer opportunities for transformative changes
and associated improved performance as a result of these
changes.
Best Practices
Best practices come from both the country and international
arenas. For instance, international best practice has assisted
CDEMA in positioning disaster management on the regional
policy agenda. For example, the Hyogo Framework for
Action (UNISDR 2005) articulated a vision that integrating
disaster reduction considerations into public policies and
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programs was the most effective way to have disaster management policy instituted at the national level. As a result, the
CDEMA Council decided to make mainstreaming disaster
management into government policies and programs one of
the objectives of the Enhanced CDM Strategy and Program
Framework 2007–2012 (CDERA 2006). Much of the CDEMA
comprehensive disaster management benchmarks come
from international organizations such as the United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction that promotes
the Hyogo Framework for Action. Further, CDEMA has
learned, based on international best practice, that managing
for results facilitates better targeted interventions, monitoring
of progress, and measuring of outcomes. CDEMA, then, has
integrated results-based management approach into its
Enhanced CDM strategy and Program Framework 2007–
2012.
Out-of-Region Experiences
Experiences from the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China, and
the Southeast Asian Tsunami in 2004 have been instructive in
helping CDEMA to assess its state of readiness for such large
scale, high impact, low probability events (Gentles 2008;
Herbert and Peets 2008; Mullin 2008). For instance, by
assessing the impacts of these overseas events, CDEMA
understood that there were critical deficiencies in mitigation.
As a consequence, emphasis on mitigation was an important
part of the enhanced CDM strategy for 2007–2012.
CDEMA has also embarked on efforts to mainstream
mitigation measures, specifically to mitigate hazard impact
on coastal communities. One such example is the testing
and subsequent adaptation of the tsunami protocol suite in
Antigua and Barbuda 7–9 July 2009 (Smart 2011). This set of
tsunami response rules was adopted after the Southeast Asian
Tsunami to shore up the regional capacity to detect tsunamis,
relay tsunami-related information in a timely manner, and
respond to them if necessary (United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization n.d.).
Self-Reflection
CDEMA does annual self-reflections through its board meetings, conferences, and dialogue with regional stakeholders
such as the Caribbean Center for Development Administration (CARICAD) as well as with international aid agencies
(Gentles 2008). Through these questioning and strategizing
sessions, the CDEMA CU proposed, and the CDEMA
Council adopted, several fundamental changes. For example,
the name change from CDERA to CDEMA in 2010 was the
culmination of this reflection—changing the name would
allow the organization to better position itself to acquire the
resources needed to achieve the broader comprehensive
disaster management (CDM) strategy. The name change
comported better with the new focus on all phases of the
disaster management cycle, not solely on disaster response.
Reflection on the name change began a decade earlier in
the late 1990s after a series of storms devastated the region
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and CDERA’s management started to question whether a
response focus was the right vision or mandate for the organization (Mullings 2008). The discussions intensified in 2006,
when the CDERA management again realized that there were
gaps in the CDM mandate as developed in 2001 and that it
needed to improve its then current strategy. The result was
the enhanced comprehensive disaster management strategy
2007–2012, which focused on measurable sector-specific
outcomes in four key areas: enhanced institutional support for
CDM program implementation at the national and regional
levels; effective mechanisms and programs for management
and sharing of CDM knowledge utilized especially for
decision-making; mainstreaming disaster risk management in
the key sectors of national economies such as tourism, agriculture, and healthcare; and enhanced community resilience
to mitigate and respond to the adverse effects of climate
change (CDERA 2006). The sectors are coordinated by the
CDM Coordination and Harmonization Council.
Through self-reflection CDEMA has realized that focusing on economic sectors via Thematic Coordinating Groups
to drive the enhanced CDM efforts would be more beneficial
than continuing to do so at the national level. For Instance,
progress reports suggest that using the sector focus has
increased awareness and advocacy for CDM and collaborative initiatives on CDM (Rahat n.d.). The sector focus is
coordinated by thematic Coordinating Groups, which provides more targeted interventions and yields better results.
The sector focus ensures more effective coverage and monitoring. Information from sectors filters up to the national
level and is analyzed, documented, and sent to the regional
level, which completes a comprehensive assessment of
achievements and shortcomings. Guided by the Coordinating
Unit, the CDEMA system then implements remedial action.
In sum, CDEMA, guided by the regional Coordinating
Unit, not only captures lessons, but also cultivates knowledge
and acts upon this knowledge to promote change. CDEMA
does this because it wants to detect and correct flaws through
strategic interventions so that the organization is not left
vulnerable in the future. More fundamentally, CDEMA cultivates knowledge through self-reflection on its fundamental
assumptions so as to strategically position itself to perform
better in the future. Argyris and Schön (1978) remind us that
when we start to question the governing variables themselves,
we operate in the realm of double-loop learning.
Senge (1990) instructs us that double-loop learning is
generative and strategic. Its perspective surrounds future
strategies involved in creating and solving an organization’s
own problems as well as integration of new and old; its
impact is transformative; its outlook is long term; its strategy
is active engagements; and its culture is system-wide thinking
and self-questioning. Using lessons learned, CDEMA,
through the CDEMA CU has questioned governing principles
and assumptions by moving from a focus on disaster response
to comprehensive disaster management. It has shifted focus
from national level planning to a more sector-specific
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approach, which involves more people in disaster management efforts. Its stance has altered from passive engagement
to a more proactive one in which it foresees problems
and tries to solve them through regional and international
alliances.
As the examples above highlight, CDEMA does experience double-loop learning. This is seen in the learning activities and changes fostered especially at the regional level.
As national level disaster management operations show,
inculcating a culture committed to learning is extremely
difficult given CDEMA’s structure and the cultural variation
present among CDEMA participating member states and the
regional Coordinating Unit. This is the biggest impediment to
establishing the learning culture that Schein advocates.

9 Barriers to Double-Loop Learning
throughout the Entire CDEMA
Organization
Even though the CDEMA CU does practice and facilitate
double-loop learning at the regional level, there are barriers,
especially at the national level that prevent the entire CDEMA
system from being a learning organization. Two different
cultures coexist in the CDEMA system. One culture at the
regional level is amenable to self-reflection, strategic assessments and intervention, and wide staff involvement. Another
culture at the national level wants to learn, but is trapped in a
vicious cycle of putting out fires because it lacks human and
other resources. This might be because the national disaster
offices are so steeped in their national government bureaucracies. The exceptions are countries like the British Virgin
Islands, the Bahamas, and Jamaica. In other words, there is a
problem-solving culture pervasive at the national level upon
which the CU and the Council attempt to superimpose and
inculcate a learning culture.
It is important to understand this context and how it
impacts learning. Carroll (1998) rightly points out that,
bureaucracies tend to drift towards rigidity because of the
politics that grow around them and their need for efficiency.
This rigidity at the country level is seen in the rules, procedures, sanctions, and political oversight built into national
systems. The regional Coordinating Unit is an intergovernmental agency and not as bogged down by the level of political oversight seen at the country level. The CU focuses all its
efforts on disaster management and is less constrained by
fights over resources than are participating countries. In addition, decision-making is easier at the CU than at the national
level where national disaster offices must struggle through
multiple levels of decision-making because of their low
status. As a consequence, double-loop learning is easier at the
regional level.
Structure determines learning processes (Simon 1969; Fiol
and Lyles 1985). While a centralized mechanistic structure
tends to reinforce past behaviors, more decentralized structure tends to allow shifts of beliefs and actions and facilitates

greater learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985). CDEMA is an organization that displays both network and bureaucratic structures
and relationships both at the regional and national levels—the
national level is more bureaucratic than networked, while
the regional level is more networked than bureaucratic. It is
understandable that we see more generative learning at the
regional level, while the national level often fails to optimize
learning opportunities. At the national level there is a focus
on single-loop or single-cause learning in that there are
frequent enough emergences that they become routine events,
political fallout from handling or reporting them must be
dealt with, and the constant struggle to access financial and
other resources exists. These conditions mean that disaster
managers are constantly responding to issues besides
disaster management. As a result, they miss important
disaster management lessons.
Learning organizations typically possess a culture committed to continuous learning and change throughout the
entire organization. As the case of CDEMA shows there are
different cultures and, consequently, different dispositions
to learning throughout the various organizational levels.
Chandler (1990) observes that at the level of overall business
environment cultural values guide business operations, structure its legal context, and provide the broad meanings by
which we interpret business events. There are leadership
issues at the national level. Because leadership is an important precursor to a culture committed to learning, those organizations that frequently change leadership will not possess a
culture committed to learning. Most of the national disaster
offices suffer from this malady; there is high turnover at the
top. This frequent changing of the guard does not provide a
fertile environment for active learning. The barriers to fostering a culture committed to learning in the CDEMA system
rest mainly at the national level.

10

Conclusion

This article shows that CDEMA practices double-loop learning despite its known barriers. The research question guiding
this research was: Is it possible to create a culture committed
to continuous self-diagnosis, learning, and change? The
evidence suggests that the regional CDEMA CU practices
double-loop learning. CDEMA detects and corrects flaws
through strategic interventions to minimize future vulnerabilities. CDEMA also cultivates knowledge through selfreflection on its fundamental assumptions and what is needed
to succeed in disaster management. These reflections and
self-questioning help CDEMA position itself strategically
to perform better in the future. The notion of facilitating a
culture committed to continuous self-diagnosis, learning, and
change is especially important for resource poor regions like
the Caribbean, which are vulnerable to external shocks and
numerous hazards. As the case of the CDEMA CU shows,
resource-poor organizations can learn and leverage doubleloop learning to limit their vulnerabilities.
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The evidence also suggests that culture and organizational
structure are important prerequisites for double-loop learning. In the CDEMA case, this article argues that in the
regional CDEMA CU where the structure is more flexible and
the leaders promote inquiry and reflection there is doubleloop learning. A culture where leaders nurture inquiry, flexibility, and change is more conducive to double-loop learning
than one where leaders are bound by political oversight and
constant distractions.
Considering CDEMA’s culture, structure, national variations, operating agreement, and ability to deliver comprehensive disaster management, there are important questions about
CDEMA’s future performance. Currently the national disaster
offices are distracted by multiple issues, including reporting
requirements, and find it difficult to engender effective
learning. Should there be a push for each country to build its
own learning capability to facilitate double-loop learning?
Alternatively, should the CDEMA system continue to rely on
the regional CU to be the driver of learning and knowledge
generation, and should it continue to be the repository of
lessons learned?
If there is a push for each country to build its own learning
capability to facilitate double-loop learning, then there must
be a reorientation in culture and structure in each member
country. Torlak (2004) recommends flexibility in organizational structure and culture that motivate managers to find
better ways of behaving, or new methods, contexts, and alternatives. This flexibility includes instilling a new mindset in
NDOs geared to anticipation, experimentation, and leveraging strategic knowledge. NDOs are less stable at the top given
the high turnover of leaders, and generally have more rigid
organizational structures than the CDEMA CU. In addition,
CDEMA should address the lack of a unified vision, focus,
and objective among its members on learning as a critical
mission strategy.
Given the vagaries of frequent changes in political leadership at the country level, as well as the rigidity of government
bureaucratic structure and culture, the CU should be given
greater authority to support a learning culture at the country
level. This move will require some structural changes in the
CDEMA organization to give the CU greater impact at the
national level. Currently, organizational structural factors of
CDEMA and its governance mechanism hinder the regional
CU from mandating action at the country level; it can merely
suggest or persuade.

Note
i The Hyogo Fremework for Action was adopted at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, 18–22 January 2005. The result of this conference was a framework for action
on Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters.
The Hyogo Framework for Action is promoted by the United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and guides
many of the strategies and actions taken on disaster reduction and
building community resilience globally, including in developing
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countries. More information on the Hyogo Framework for Action
can be found in United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction 2005.
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